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Parental Unemployment, Social Insurance 
and Child Well-Being across Countries*
Based on a unique repeated cross-sectional data set of school-aged children in Europe, 
the Middle East and North America, we analyze how children’s subjective well-being is 
related to parents’ employment status, depending on the institutional context. We find that 
parental unemployment is strongly negatively related to children’s life satisfaction across 
countries and years. The effect is thereby moderated by the generosity of unemployment 
benefits. Exploiting across- and within-country variation, our results suggest that a higher 
benefit replacement rate alleviates the negative effects of fathers’, but not mothers’, 
unemployment. We further test the robustness of our results considering unemployment 
benefits jointly with social work norms. While the buffering effect of unemployment 
insurance remains, the spillover effects of paternal unemployment seem to be more 
pronounced in environments with stricter social work norms.
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1 Introduction
How can children and adolescents, some of the most vulnerable members of our society, be
protected from economic shocks that hit them via their parents’ unemployment? This ques-
tion is – unfortunately – of heightened topicality with unemployment on the rise in many
countries due to the corona virus pandemic.
While any contemporaneous effect of paternal or maternal unemployment on children’s well-
being is highly relevant per se, recent evidence indicates that there might be long-term
consequences. Layard et al. (2014), for example, emphasize children’s emotional health as
“the most powerful childhood predictor of adult life-satisfaction” (p. 720). Related work
emphasizes the importance of early years experiences in building up capabilities which foster
well-being across the life-cycle (e.g., Knudsen et al., 2006; Heckman, Stixrud and Urzua,
2006). Given the evidence of child well-being as a predictor of economic outcomes and well-
being in adult life, it is important to understand potential spillover effects of macroeconomic
conditions on children and how these potentially can be alleviated.
We study external effects of parental unemployment on their children’s subjective well-being
as direct proxies of their individual welfare in a cross-country setting to identify potential
moderating effects of policies and contextual factors.1 Precisely, we analyze to what extent
the generosity of unemployment benefits moderates potential negative effects of parent’s
unemployment. The generosity of unemployment benefits might alleviate the burden of
parental unemployment directly through a smaller reduction in consumption opportunities
for the household (and consequently also for the children); but also indirectly through less
(financially) distressed parents. We are not aware of any existing systematic evidence on this
potential capacity of a central institution of social security. With this approach, we com-
plement the line of research that studies interventions and policies which are immediately
directed at child well-being (e.g., Heckman et al., 2010, Heckman, Pinto and Savelyev, 2013).
We further consider whether the strength of the social norm to work potentially alleviates the
experience of parental unemployment for children. By considering both formal and informal
1There is an enormous body of literature that is concerned with understanding people’s well-being in
terms of their reported life satisfaction as well as positive and negative affects. In economics, there are a series
of monographs including, e.g., Frey and Stutzer (2002a); Frey (2008); Layard (2011) and Graham (2017), as
well as review articles including, e.g., Frey and Stutzer (2002b), Stutzer and Frey (2010) and Clark (2018).
For contributions from a psychological perspective, see, e.g., the collections in David, Boniwell and Ayers
(2013), Sheldon and Lucas (2014), or the handbook by Diener, Oishi and Tay (2018). Different measures to
capture child well-being are reviewed in Ben-Arieh et al. (2014).
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institutional factors jointly, we complement existing literature by acknowledging a potential
correlation between the generosity of unemployment benefits and social work norms that
might drive any observed correlations.
For our analysis we rely on a unique repeated cross-sectional data set of school-aged children
in Europe, the Middle East, the US and Canada, 33 countries in total, for the years 2001/02,
2004/05, 2009/10 and 2013/14 and combine it with data on labor market institutions and
social norms. For the identification of the interaction effect between parental unemployment
and the generosity of unemployment benefits, we rely on variation in the benefit level be-
tween and within a country over time while controlling for country- and year-specific levels
of well-being.
We first document that parental unemployment is negatively related to child well-being and
that there are sizeable between-country differences in this effect. Second, we provide evidence
that generous unemployment benefits, on average, alleviate the burden of father’s unemploy-
ment. However, we find no such effect for mother’s unemployment. Third, we consider social
work norms as informal institutional factors that might drive any observed correlation with
unemployment benefits due to a potential endogeneity between the two factors. We indeed
observe that social norms and paternal unemployment seem to interact. The evidence sug-
gests that the negative effects for children are more pronounced in environments with stricter
injunctive work norms. Importantly, the moderating effect of unemployment benefits for pa-
ternal unemployment is robust to including any proxy for descriptive and injunctive work
norms. Our analysis extends a rich literature on the consequences of unemployment on peo-
ple’s well-being. As this existing work serves as an important foundation for our theoretical
arguments and empirical approach, we refer to it in more detail in Section 2. Section 3 de-
scribes the dataset “Health Behavior in School-aged Children” and the appended macro-level
data that we use in our analysis. In Section 4, we lay out our empirical strategy. In Section 5,
we present the main effect of parental unemployment on child well-being. Section 6 shows
the results of our analysis concerning a moderating effect of unemployment insurance and
provides two robustness tests for this. Section 7 concludes.
2 Unemployment and individuals’ subjective well-being
In the following, we document that unemployment has various effects that relate to people’s
well-being in the short and in the long run. While the accumulation of some findings have
2
turned them to stylized facts, there is other evidence which looks rather inconclusive. We
conjecture that some of the effect heterogeneity might be understood if contextual factors
are more systematically taken into account. Our partial review starts with the effects of
personally experiencing unemployment, before proceeding to the spillover effects on relatives
and children in particular. We then refer to the moderating factors of the well-being costs
of unemployment in terms of particular policies as well as informal institutions, i.e. social
work norms.
2.1 Effects on unemployed persons
The personal experience of unemployment is one of the most detrimental events for an indi-
vidual’s subjective well-being. Research in economics and other social sciences has provided
substantial evidence that there is a causal negative relationship between unemployment and
life satisfaction. Moreover, the effect seems long-lasting, i.e., life satisfaction does not only
drop significantly upon entry to unemployment, but also does not recover completely to its
initial level upon re-employment (for reviews, see, e.g., Frey and Stutzer, 2002b; Winkelmann,
2014). The loss in income thereby cannot fully account for the disutility of unemployment,
meaning that the negative effects of unemployment are still found in statistical estimates
when income is considered as a control variable. The non-pecuniary costs rather seem to
outweigh the pecuniary costs (e.g., Kassenboehmer and Haisken-DeNew, 2009). The em-
pirical evidence indicates that employment - apart from income - provides individuals with
several latent benefits, such as time structure, social contacts, activity, purpose, and, im-
portantly, status and identity (aspects that were first prominently emphasized in Jahoda,
1981). The social costs of unemployment thus substantially exceed the costs of an economy
operating below its potential, both through the non-pecuniary costs of unemployment for
the individual, and, as we emphasize here, also through negative externalities for spouses
and children.2
2.2 Effects on spouses and children
Similar as the affected individual, relatives have to cope with reduced household income but
presumably also with a partner or parent who is suffering psychologically. Several studies
2Moreover, higher unemployment also affects the employed as it increases the negative anticipatory
feelings related to economic insecurity (Luechinger, Meier and Stutzer, 2010.)
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provide corresponding evidence for a decrease in subjective well-being following the partner’s
job loss, which, in line with traditional gender roles, was found to be particularly pronounced
for women (e.g., Winkelmann and Winkelmann, 1995; Esche, 2020). Previous studies on in-
tergenerational spillover effects have primarily focused on the effects of parental labor force
status on children’s educational and labor market outcomes and found quite mixed evi-
dence. Müller, Riphahn and Schwientek (2017), for example, find, using data from Germany,
that paternal unemployment has no effect on children’s youth employment status, though
daughters, on average, tend to invest more in their education upon father’s unemployment.
Fradkin, Panier and Tojerow (2019) find that children of unemployed parents in Belgium
increase their labor supply and work by around 9 % more in the first three years following
labor market entry compared to children whose parents lose their job after the child’s labor
market entry. Mörk, Sjögren and Svaleryd (2019), on the other hand, find that childhood
health, GPA or employment are not negatively affected by the experience of parental unem-
ployment in childhood in Sweden.
Specific Effects on Child Well-Being – Evidence on the effects of a parent’s job loss for
child well-being is scarce. As for spouses, the well-being of children may be affected by the
pecuniary consequences of parental unemployment, i.e., through a reduction in consumption
opportunities due to a lower disposable household income; but also through non-pecuniary
mechanisms. First, children might be negatively affected by their unemployed parent’s re-
duced psychological well-being. Powdthavee and Vignoles (2008), for example, provide ev-
idence that there is a significant correlation between parents’ mental distress (particularly
the one of fathers) and the subjective well-being of children. Second, children themselves
might be exposed to stigmatization in their environment either directly due to parents’ labor
market status or due to reduced consumption opportunities that lead to feelings of envy
and possibly to fewer social interactions (e.g., Schneider et al., 2000). Unemployed parents,
on the other hand, spend significantly more time with their offspring (Knabe et al., 2010).
As childcare positively relates to the formation of human capital for children (Becker and
Tomes, 1986), increasing parenting time due to unemployment might as well be beneficial
for the children, particularly for younger ones. Powdthavee and Vernoit (2013) find, at least
partly in line with that, that parental unemployment in the UK is, on average, not statis-
tically significantly related to child well-being unless age differences are considered, as the
effect is positive at young age and gets more negative the older the children are when they
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experience a parent’s job loss. Furthermore, they find that the overall effect is particularly
negative for girls, whereas the effect of maternal unemployment is worse for boys. Using data
from the German Socio-Economic Panel (SOEP), Haisken-DeNew and Kind (2012) find no
effect of parental unemployment on daughter’s subjective well-being. A negative effect on
son’s well-being was only found if the father, but not the mother, became involuntary un-
employed. Investigating mental health outcomes, Bubonya, Cobb-Clark and Wooden (2017)
look at spillover effects of unemployment for spouses and children in the Australian household
survey (HILDA). They, reversely, find no direct support for the hypothesis that a father’s
job loss affects mental health of the children negatively, though they find such an effect for
maternal unemployment. Moreover, they do find that the effects are stronger for girls than
boys. Nikolova and Nikolaev (2018) additionally provide evidence that negative well-being
effects of parental unemployment are long lasting: Considering only exogenous unemploy-
ment shocks and controlling for an array of individual, parental and family characteristics,
they report a strong negative effect of maternal unemployment between the age of 0 and 5
and of paternal unemployment between the age of 10 and 15 on the life satisfaction of the
offspring when they are between 18 and 31 years old.
Taken together, existing evidence generally suggests a rather negative effect of parental un-
employment on child well-being though the results are not congruent across countries - an
aspect we take up in our cross-country study.
2.3 Policies moderating the well-being costs of unemployment
The negative well-being effects of personal unemployment have also been found to differ
widely across countries (see, e.g., Gallie and Russell, 1998; Ahn, García and Jimeno, 2004;
Caroll, 2007). Several studies have consequently investigated potentially moderating factors
of the well-being costs of unemployment. As economic strain is an important determinant
of psychological distress, most studies have focused on passive labor market programs in
terms of unemployment benefits which compensate at least part of the loss in income that
is associated with unemployment. Though the evidence is not completely unambiguous, the
majority of recent studies suggests a substantial moderating effect of the generosity of unem-
ployment benefits on the life satisfaction of the unemployed (e.g., Ochsen and Welsch, 2012;
Wulfgramm, 2014; O’Campo et al., 2015; Voßemer et al., 2018) mainly through increased
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financial satisfaction (e.g., Ahn, García and Jimeno, 2004).3 Active labor market programs,
such as training or job creation measures, which may re-provide unemployed individuals at
least with a part of the latent benefits that are associated with the non-pecuniary costs of
unemployment, were, however, not shown to be alleviating the negative effects of job loss
but, if anything, rather to aggravate them (e.g., Voßemer et al., 2018).4
Little is known on whether moderating effects translate to how children are affected from
their parents’ unemployment. Of the few studies, Regmi (2019) exploits variation in un-
employment insurance benefits over US states and time and finds that an increase of 1 %
reduces the likelihood that a child has to repeat a grade by around 1.1 %. Lindemann and
Gangl (2019) similarly find that contexts which provide more generous unemployment in-
surance alleviate the adverse effects of parental unemployment on entry to post-secondary
education. Mörk, Sjögren and Svaleryd (2019), studying health, educational and job-related
spillover effects of parental job loss in Sweden, also emphasize the importance of their study
setting in a Nordic country, with generous welfare institutions and strong dual-earner norms
which are potentially "able to cushion and insure against negative shocks to the family en-
vironment" (p.6). Hence, next to potentially buffering policies, the authors hint at informal
institutions which might similarly work as moderating factors, which we will discuss in the
following subsection.
2.4 The moderating role of social work norms
On the side of informal institutions, social work norms have been proposed as another moder-
ator of the well-being costs of unemployment (and relatedly also people’s job search behavior).
Several studies find that the well-being costs of unemployment are less severe in areas with
higher unemployment (e.g, Clark (2003) for the UK, Powdthavee (2007) for South Africa
and Shields, Wheatley Price and Wooden (2009) for Australia), arguing that a higher un-
employment rate might reduce the normative pressure to work, as more people deviate from
3Di Tella, MacCulloch and Oswald (2003) find that the generosity of publicly provided unemployment
insurance positively correlates with subjective well-being, but find no significant interaction with personal
employment status. Eichhorn (2014) finds no robust relationship between log expenditures of unemployment
benefits payments per capita and life satisfaction for the whole population and also no significant moderating
effect for the unemployed.
4We refrain from testing the moderating effect of active labor market policies for spillover effects on
children’s well-being not only because previous evidence suggests no such moderating effects on the personal
level, but mainly because of the difficulty that children whose parents are taking part in active labor market
programs might no longer report their parents as unemployed.
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the norm to make one’s own living. Schwarz (2012) and Chadi (2014), however, find no
such relationship using data from Germany and some cross-country studies were not able to
replicate the earlier findings either (e.g., Stavrova, Schlösser and Fetchenhauer, 2011). While
a higher unemployment rate might reduce the normative pressure to work, as more people
deviate from the norm to make one’s own living and thus leading to the norm to deteriorate,
it cannot be distinguished from the potentially countervailing effect of worse labor market
prospects, which might explain why the evidence on the moderating potential of descriptive
norms is not unambiguous.5 Further research accordingly deployed measures of injunctive
norms, which, compared to descriptive norms, do not describe group behavior, but rather
shared beliefs of how one ought behave (Cialdini, Reno and Kallgren, 1990).
Stavrova, Schlösser and Fetchenhauer (2011), for example, take country-averages on state-
ments from the World Value Survey (WVS) as a proxy measure of the societal injunctive
norm to work and report greater life satisfaction gaps between the employed and the unem-
ployed where such norms are stronger. Stutzer and Lalive (2004) use outcomes from a popular
vote on the support of generous unemployment benefits as a proxy measure for the regional
strength of work norms and provide evidence that individuals in municipalities with stronger
work norms (and less support of generous benefits) do not only experience larger drops in
life satisfaction upon unemployment, but that the social pressure also prompts them to find
a job again more quickly. With their empirical approach to measuring social work norms,
Stutzer and Lalive (2004) stress the endogeneity of social norms and unemployment benefits
as an electorate will rather support political parties favoring more generous unemployment
benefits in areas with less strict social norms to work.6
5In our setting, this difficulty might be aggravated as it does not only signal labor market prospects for
the parents, but also future labor market prospects for the adolescents themselves.
6Considering the co-evolution of policies and norms even further, higher unemployment benefits might
weaken work norms in the long-term (e.g., Lindbeck, 1995). In a welfare state setting, social work norms
constrain the influence of economic disincentives of unemployment insurance by preventing individuals to
apply for benefits to avoid disutility from norm violation by stigmatization and a loss of reputation. With
sufficiently generous unemployment benefits relative to after-tax wages, the conflict between social norms and
economic incentives may gradually lead more individuals to stop obeying with the norms, thus increasing the
number of beneficiaries. Assuming that the disutility from norm deviation is decreasing with the number of
people not complying with the norms, work norms might be endogenous to the generosity of unemployment
benefits themselves (e.g., Lindbeck, 1995; Ljunge, 2012). This co-evolution might be particularly relevant in
intergenerational contexts as generous social insurance might weaken parents’ incentives to instill stronger
work ethics in their children (e.g., Bisin and Verdier, 2005; Lindbeck and Nyberg, 2006). Though the
generosity of unemployment benefits should mostly affect the pecuniary costs of unemployment, Wulfgramm
(2014), for example, finds a statistically significant moderating effect of unemployment benefits on the well-
being of the unemployed, also after income is controlled for. In line with a potential endogeneity between
unemployment benefits and social norms, she concludes that the effect of the generosity of unemployment
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Work norms might, moreover, act gender-specific. According to the gender identity hy-
pothesis by Akerlof and Kranton (2000), people derive identity utility from conforming to
social norms which are related to one’s gender. Previous research finds significantly stronger
negative well-being effects of unemployment for men than for women (see, e.g., Frey and
Stutzer, 2002b) and attributes this to the fact that men suffer more from an identity loss
than women, as the social norm prescribes men to be the breadwinner. Roex and Rözer
(2018), accordingly, find that the moderating effect of social work norms is stronger for men
than for women.
3 Data
Our empirical analysis is based on the four latest waves of the Health Behavior in School-aged
Children (HBSC) survey. To consider contextual differences which might reinforce or buffer
the effects of parental unemployment on child well-being, we combine the HBSC data with
data on labor market institutions, economic conditions and social norms. Details on the main
data set and these measures are provided in subsections 3.1, 3.2 and 3.3. Subsection 3.4 shows
the correlations between the country-level explanatory variables. Table A2 in the Appendix
further provides an overview of the data availability by country and HBSC wave.
3.1 Parental unemployment and child well-being in the HBSC
The HBSC is a repeated cross-sectional survey on health and health behavior of adolescents
between the age of 11 and 17 years from 43 countries in Europe, the Middle East and North
America. The HBSC data offers the opportunity to study child well-being in a repeated
cross-sectional setting as, since the third wave (2001/2), respondents from all participating
countries are asked to rate their life satisfaction on the 11-point scale of the Cantril Self-
Anchoring Striving Scale (Cantril, 1965), often referred to as the “Cantril ladder”. Children
are asked: “Here is a picture of a ladder. Suppose the top of the ladder represents the best
possible life for you and the bottom of the ladder the worst possible life. Where on the ladder
do you feel you stand at the present time?”. As an evaluative measure of subjective well-
being, the Cantril ladder has been used for both adults and children and was shown to have
good convergent validity and reliability for samples of adolescents (Bradshaw et al., 2013,
benefits is thus not strictly pecuniary, but may reflect less stigmatization and loss of self-confidence for the
unemployed in countries where benefits are more generous.
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Levin and Currie, 2014).7 Next to life satisfaction, the HBSC data provides information on
child characteristics (e.g., age, gender), health behavior, social environment and family situ-
ation. Among that, children are asked about both their mother’s and father’s occupations,
which allows us to construct a measure of parental unemployment. The information on fa-
thers’, respectively mothers’, occupations are classified into six socio-economic status (SES)
groups, and six further categories, i.e., “home working”, “looking for a job”, “sick, retired,
student”, “don’t know”, “don’t have or see parent” or “not classifiable”. For our measure of
unemployment, we consider all job categories (SES 1-6) as “occupied”. “Looking for a job” is
considered involuntarily unemployed, whereas all other categories - except for “home work-
ing” - are coded as missing. Due to the possibility that children indicate their unemployed
mother or father as “home working”, either because they do not know their true employment
status or because they are ashamed of referring to them as unemployed, we create a third
category for “home working” parents.
Compared to previous studies using national household surveys (e.g., Haisken-DeNew and
Kind, 2012; Powdthavee and Vernoit, 2013; Bubonya, Cobb-Clark and Wooden, 2017), the
HBSC allows measuring the effect of parental unemployment, irrespective of whether the child
lives in the same household or not, as the questionnaire asks for both parents’ employment
statuses as well as the household type. Figure A1 in the Appendix graphically depicts the
coding scheme of the parental employment status variable. Next to their parents’ occupation,
children are asked whether they live with both parents, their father or their mother. For those
children whose parents live in separate households, we deploy the information on whether
they are in contact with the parents. Thus, we consider any biological/legal parent that the
child indicates to be in contact with and not only parents living together with the child. All
observations, for which the parental occupation status is missing for a parent that the child
is in contact with, are dropped. For those children, who live with either mother or father
and indicate that they are not in contact with the other, we code this parent’s employment
status as “not in contact with”. This allows us to estimate the relationship between maternal,
respectively paternal, unemployment, conditional on the other parent’s employment status,
without dropping children who are raised by a single parent.
7Levin and Currie (2014) show that the test-retest reliability is slightly weaker for teenagers than for
younger children. Yet, they ascribe the lower test-retest reliability to a reduced stability of life satisfaction
of teenagers, i.e., mood swings in puberty, rather than to a reduced reliability of the scale with increasing
age.
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Table 1: Parental employment status
Maternal employment status Paternal employment status
Observations Share Observations Share
Working 403,155 81.89% 449,800 91.37%
Home working 64,452 13.09% 3,929 0.80%
Unemployed 21,635 4.39% 13,774 2.80%
Not in contact with 3,048 0.62% 24,787 5.04%
Total 492,290 492,290
Note: The table shows the distribution of maternal and paternal employment statuses for our main
sample. “Working” contains all job categories (SES 1-6). “Home Working” is based on the oc-
cupsesmo/occupsesfa category “Home working”, unemployed on the category "looking for a job".
“Not in contact with” is based on the question “How easy is it for you to talk to the following persons
about things that really bother you”, where one possible answer is “Don’t have or see this person”.
Table 1 displays the distribution of maternal and paternal employment statuses for our sam-
ple. From the two separate indicators for mother’s and father’s status, we then generate
a variable of parental unemployment, coding 1 if at least one parent is looking for a job
(N=32,736 (6.65%), of which N=2,673 (0.54%) have both parents unemployed) and 0 oth-
erwise (N=459,554). The unemployment rate indicated by children per country and year
strongly correlates (r=0.82, p=0.000) with the official unemployment rate of the OECD. Yet
in the level, the unemployment rate is mostly smaller in our sample than in the official statis-
tics (see Figure A2 in the Appendix). The positive difference could, on the one hand, be
due to higher employment rates of adults with dependent children in comparison to national
averages. On the other hand, children might under-report parental unemployment because
of social stigma. Assuming that those children who are ashamed to report their parents’
unemployment are likely to suffer strongly in terms of well-being from their parents’ lot,
this would mean that our results for any negative correlation of unemployment with child
well-being are downward biased. If those children who suffer from shaming for their parents’
unemployment report their parents as being employed, those children would, in our case,
end up in the “non-treated” group, depressing this group’s estimates towards the “treated”
group. Otherwise they would fall into the missing category, which would reduce any potential
negative correlation due to those missing observations in the “treated group”.8
8The only scenario that we could think of which would potentially upward bias our estimates is that




The generosity of unemployment benefits in any given country and year is based on data
on average replacement rates from the OECD. The OECD releases data on the country net
replacement rates for the unemployed as a proportion of the previous in-work income which is
maintained after 1, 2, ..., T months of unemployment. As our data is cross-sectional and does
neither indicate the employment status before, nor the duration of parental unemployment,
we cannot match specific replacement rates, which consider unemployment duration and
eligibility, to the individual-level data set. We therefore calculate a more general measure
of the generosity of unemployment benefits, taking the arithmetic mean of six different
replacement rates, i.e., for two different unemployment durations (six and twelve months) and
three family types (couple with two children and average earnings for the partner, couple with
two children and partner out of work, and single parent with two dependent children). Due
to the nature of our research question, we do not consider replacement rates for individuals
without dependent children. Figure A3 in the Appendix displays the average replacement
rate by country and survey year for the countries in our sample.
3.3 Social work norms
We employ measures of descriptive as well as injunctive norms regarding the importance of
pursuing paid work. As a descriptive measure of the social norm to work, we use annual
national unemployment rates from the OECD (see Figure A4 in the Appendix for details). As
a gender-specific variant, we consider the share of women actively participating in the labor
market. Specifically, we use data on the ratio of female-to-male labor force participation
rates from the Worldbank (see Figure A5 in the Appendix for details).
As a measure of the societal injunctive norm to work, we combine and average answers
to five statements from the World, respectively European, Value Survey (WVS) separately
for each country9: (1) “To fully develop your talents, you need to have a job.”, (2) “It is
humiliating to receive money without working for it.”, (3) “People who don’t work become
lazy.”, (4) “Work is a duty towards society.” and (5) “Work should always come first, even
if it means less free time.”. The scale (Cronbach α = 0.71) thus describes the extent to
which work is a moral duty, respectively the strength of the norm to provide for oneself
9We thus follow the strategy pursued in van Oorschot (2006), Stavrova, Schlösser and Fetchenhauer
(2011), or Stam et al. (2016).
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as opposed to live off others. For the resulting measure, higher values denote a stronger
social norm to work. As a measure for gender-specific injunctive work norms, we use answers
to a question in the WVS where respondents indicate their agreement with the statement
“When jobs are scarce, men should have more right to work than women” on a 3-Point scale
with answer options “Disagree”, “Neither nor” and “Agree”. We recode answers such that
country averages can be interpreted as the share of respondents in a country agreeing with
the statement. As social norms tend to be rather stable and as the WVS is conducted
in different years than the HBSC survey, we make no attempt to exploit within-country
variation in the strength of norms over time. Instead, we calculate mean scores by country
over all available waves of the WVS and thus consider the strength of norms as constant
over time.10 In a robustness analysis, we consider that the strength of norms within the own
generation might be particularly relevant for the spillover effects on children. Accordingly,
we might introduce a bias by applying population-wide averages, instead of focusing on the
relevant reference group. We therefore additionally calculate a measure of average norms
in the younger generation (i.e., the respondents below the age of 25 at the time they are
surveyed). Figure A6 in the Appendix displays averages for both the general population and
the population under 25 by country.
3.4 Correlations between the country-level explanatory variables
Figure 1 shows the correlations between the variables capturing the contextual factors that
potentially moderate the effect of parental unemployment on child well-being. As expected,
social security policies are to some extent correlated with labor market conditions and norms.
We take this up in our empirical analysis when isolating the interaction effect of unemploy-
ment benefits. In panel 1a, we observe that the correlation between the average replacement
rate and the unemployment rate, as a descriptive measure of the general norm to work, is
rather low (r = −0.22, n.s.). Panel 1c further indicates a slight negative correlation be-
tween the generosity of unemployment benefits and general work norms (r = −0.13, n.s.).
Panels 1b and 1d demonstrate distinct correlations between unemployment benefits and
gender-specific work norms. Panel 1b shows a positive correlation with higher female la-
bor force participation (r = 0.42, p < 0.01) that is partly driven by the two observations
10While we cannot test this explicitly, we argue that the assumption of stable norms within the short
time-frame of our data (i.e., 2001 to 2014) is not far-fetched. Previous evidence suggests that norms and
values evolve rather slowly over generations (e.g., Mannheim, 1964).
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on the left and Panel 1d a negative correlation with injunctive gender-specific work norms
(r = −0.39, p < 0.01), which is measured such that higher values denote more traditional
gender norms.11 Countries with stronger social norms to work as opposed to living off ben-
efits and stronger male bread-winning norms thus tend to feature lower replacement rates.
This observation reinforces the need to test the robustness of our results in a joint model
later in the empirical analysis.
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Note: The figures present the correlations between unemployment benefits and our measures
of social work norms. Panel 1a shows the correlation between the unemployment rate and
the generosity of unemployment benefits (r = 0.22, n.s). Panel 1b displays the correlation
between the ratio of female-to-male labor force participation rates (r = 0.42, p < 0.01 and
r = 0.34, p < 0.01 when excluding the two observations with a very low female labor force
participation) and unemployment benefits. Panel 1c and 1d show the correlations between
general injunctive work norms and (r = −0.13, n.s.) and injunctive gender-specific work
norms (r = −0.39, p < 0.01) and average replacement rates.
11Though not shown here, additional analyses further showed a strong correlation between the survey
measures for the general social work norm and the gender-specific one (r = 0.77, p < 0.01).
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4 Empirical Strategy
The identification of the effect of unemployment on well-being is challenging. This holds in
particular for analyses based on cross-sectional data. They potentially suffer from reversed
causality as it cannot be ruled out that inherently dissatisfied individuals are more likely to
be laid off, or from omitted variable bias as there might be unobserved common determinants
of both (low) life satisfaction and unemployment. We have singleton observations of each
child and hence do not observe them before and after experiencing the mother or father
losing their job. We think that reverse causality is less threatening in our case as the relation
between a child’s life satisfaction and their parents’ employment status is to a lesser extent
obvious than the relation between personal life satisfaction and employment status. However,
unobserved common drivers of a child’s life satisfaction and parental unemployment, such as,
for instance, living in a poor neighborhood, cannot be ruled out easily. In order to minimize
the omitted variable bias, we adopt a specific control strategy taking into account proxy
measures for parents’ wealth. Subsection 4.1 explains the construction of the main control
variables and the specification of the baseline estimation model.
For the identification of the moderating effect of the main contextual factor, i.e., the
generosity of unemployment benefits, we rely on variation between and within countries over
time. We can thus apply a rigorous control strategy to capture the interaction effect between
parents’ unemployment and benefits. Subsection 4.2 introduces the corresponding extended
estimation model with the interaction term.
4.1 Baseline estimation model
In our baseline estimation model for the correlation between parents’ unemployment and a
child’s subjective well-being, we stepwise control for the family’s financial resources using
two different measures. First, we use proxy measures of family wealth included in the family
affluence scale (FAS), a brief assets-based measure of family wealth developed by Currie et al.
(1997) for the HBSC. The FAS includes four items, which are simple to answer and reflect
family ownership or access to goods and services that are relevant to family circumstances.
Precisely, children are asked whether they have their own bedroom, about the number of
cars the family owns, the number of computers in the household and the number of holidays
the family spends per year. Furthermore, the survey includes a question on the child’s per-
ception of its family’s socio-economic circumstances, asking them to answer “How well do
14
you think your family is off? ” on a scale from (1) “Not at all well off ” to (5) “Very well off ”.
Though a rigorous statistical control of the family’s ex-ante income situation is not possible,
we use the indicators on whether the child has its own bedroom, the number of family cars
and the number of computers as a rough measure of the family’s wealth. With this control
variable, we aim at reducing potential selection effects. The two other items, i.e., the well-off
indicator and the number of holidays per year, we expect to be more responsive to changes
in household income due to parental unemployment and thus to vary in the short-run. Ac-
cordingly, we introduce these measures in a subsequent step to not only further reduce any
selection bias, but to also isolate the non-pecuniary costs of parental unemployment for their
children.12
Specifically, we estimate the following linear regression for child i, living in country c, inter-
viewed in survey year t:
LifeSatisfactionict = β1 ParentalUEict + β2X
′
ict + τc ∗ δt + εict (1)
where LifeSatisfactionict is the child’s well-being measured using the Cantril Self-Anchoring
Striving Scale. ParentalUEict is a dummy variable indicating whether at least one parent
is unemployed, such that β1 is our main coefficient of interest. Alternatively, we use dummy
variables for both father’s and mother’s unemployment. When splitting the parental un-
employment variable into maternal and paternal unemployment, we additionally control for
whether both parents are unemployed.13 X ′ict is a matrix of individual covariates, that in-
cludes dummies for gender, age, as well as their interaction, as prior research shows that life
satisfaction profiles of girls develop differently over puberty than those of boys (e.g., Brad-
shaw et al., 2013). Furthermore, we control for whether the respondent is an only child, and
whether the child lives with the mother, the father, or with both parents (the latter serves as
reference category).14 Importantly, we add measures for family wealth and current income
proxies in subsequent steps. τc ∗ δt represents country-specific year fixed effects to control for
common shocks that might affect all children in a given country in a given survey year. εict
12For more details on the measures of family wealth and income see Appendix A.1.2.
13Either individual coefficient for maternal and paternal unemployment can then be interpreted as the
partial correlation as if the other parent is employed.
14Previous studies have shown that unemployment increases the probability of divorce (e.g., Jensen and
Smith, 1990), which in turn negatively affects a child’s well-being (Amato and Cheadle, 2005).
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is an idiosyncratic error term, with two-way standard errors clustered at the country-survey
year level to account for possible correlation of the individual-level residuals within the same
country and survey year.
For the statistical analysis, the ordinal variable life satisfaction is treated as a cardi-
nal measure in an ordinary least square regression. Previous research has shown that this
simplification seems to matter little for the qualitative as well as the quantitative results
(e.g., Ferrer-i Carbonell and Frijters, 2004). Further, our following analyses using interaction
terms would not allow for an intuitive interpretation of ordered logit or probit models (e.g.,
Ai and Norton, 2003).
4.2 Extended estimation model with interaction terms
Taking a cross-national comparative perspective, we identify potential moderating effects
of contextual factors. Specifically, we exploit variation within countries over time15 using
country τc and time fixed effects δt to control for time-invariant heterogeneity at the national
level, as well as time-specific shocks across the sample:
LifeSatisfactionict = β1 ParentalUEict + β2 Macroct+
β3 ParentalUEict ∗Macroct + β4X ′ict + τc + δt + εict
(2)
where Macroct is one or more of the variables average replacement rate (Benefitsct), un-
employment rate (UERct) as a general measure of the descriptive work norm, ratio of the
female to male labor participation rate (FemaleLaborct) as an approximation of gender-
specific work norm, or the country-level averages on injunctive work norms from the WVS.
To control for current labor market conditions, we hold the unemployment rate constant
throughout all our estimations which include interaction terms with contextual factors. We
normalize all moderating macro-level variables using the mean and the standard deviation
of the respective variables in our sample of interest.
15As explained in subsection 3.3, we refrain from exploiting variation in the WVS norm measures over
time and thus only estimate the interaction effect with parental unemployment for those indicators. The
coefficients for the main effects of the norm variables are dropped due to perfect collinearity with the country
fixed effects.
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5 The effect of parental unemployment on child well-being
Table 2 presents the results of our baseline model 1. When simply comparing levels of sub-
jective well-being in column 1, we find that children in households with at least one parent
unemployed are, on average, less satisfied with their life. However, this difference might be
due to factors other than parents’ unemployment. To reduce potential omitted variable bias,
we take proxy measures for household wealth into account, i.e., the number of family cars,
computers at home and whether the child has its own bedroom. The results in column 2
show that the partial correlations for these control variables are as expected: Children in
families with more cars, computers and their own bedroom are, on average, more satisfied
with their lives. Controlling for family wealth, we still find a sizable and statistically signifi-
cant correlation between parental unemployment and child well-being. On average, children
with at least one unemployed parent report a 0.223 point lower level of satisfaction with
life (measured on the 11-point scale). This is a substantial difference, similar to the one of
living in a relatively more wealthy household with one or more computers. In column 3, a
decomposition of the effect with regard to pecuniary and non-pecuniary costs of parental
unemployment is pursued. For this, we additionally control for proxies of the household’s
current income situation. We find these measures, based on self-reports, to have substantial
predictive power for child well-being: Compared to children who indicate their family’s fi-
nancial situation to be “average”, children who state their family to be “not at all well off”
have, on average, a one point lower life satisfaction. Regarding the correlation with parental
unemployment, a negative relationship with children’s life satisfaction remains, suggesting
consequences of parental unemployment on child well-being that go beyond the pure pe-
cuniary costs of joblessness. Turning to columns 4 to 6, we find through all models that
having an unemployed father seems to affect child well-being significantly more negatively
than having an unemployed mother.16
16The coefficients of maternal and paternal unemployment in columns 4 to 6 are weighted averages over
the different employment statuses of the respective other gender. As we otherwise might underestimate the
effects by children who have both parents unemployed, we additionally use a dummy variable to control for
the possibility that both parents are unemployed. The results for all control variables which are not shown
in Table 2 can be found in Table B2 in the Appendix.
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Table 2: Parental unemployment and child well-being
Dependent Variable: Life Satisfaction
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
At least one parent unemployed -0.289*** -0.223*** -0.073***
(0.018) (0.016) (0.015)
Mother unemployed -0.219*** -0.166*** -0.054***
(0.018) (0.018) (0.016)
Father unemployed -0.384*** -0.307*** -0.104***
(0.028) (0.024) (0.022)
Proxies for family wealth
Reference category: No family car
One car 0.196*** 0.098*** 0.185*** 0.093***
(0.016) (0.014) (0.016) (0.014)
Two or more cars 0.301*** 0.099*** 0.287*** 0.093***
(0.016) (0.014) (0.016) (0.014)
Reference category: No computer at home
One computer 0.188*** 0.082*** 0.184*** 0.083***
(0.022) (0.018) (0.022) (0.018)
Two computers 0.223*** 0.053** 0.218*** 0.053**
(0.024) (0.021) (0.024) (0.021)
More than 2 computers 0.198*** -0.040* 0.193*** -0.039*
(0.026) (0.022) (0.025) (0.022)
Reference category: No own bedroom
Own bedroom 0.206*** 0.106*** 0.207*** 0.107***
(0.014) (0.010) (0.014) (0.010)
Proxies for current income situation
Not at all well off -1.026*** -1.023***
(0.088) (0.088)
Not very well off -0.809*** -0.807***
(0.024) (0.024)
Reference category: Average
Quite well off 0.465*** 0.465***
(0.015) (0.015)
Very well off 0.921*** 0.920***
(0.027) (0.027)
Reference category: No holiday/year
One holiday/year 0.239*** 0.239***
(0.015) (0.015)
Two holidays/year 0.332*** 0.333***
(0.019) (0.019)
More than two holidays/year 0.447*** 0.447***
(0.023) (0.023)
Individual controls X X X X X X
Country-year FE X X X X X X
Observations 492,290 492,290 492,290 492,290 492,290 492,290
R-squared 0.071 0.076 0.134 0.072 0.077 0.134
Note: The table shows the relationship between parental unemployment (columns 1-3), respectively maternal and
paternal unemployment (columns 4-6), and child life satisfaction using OLS, subsequently adding measures for
family wealth (columns 2 and 5) and current income proxies (columns 3 and 6). Standard errors are two-way
clustered by country and survey year and displayed in parentheses. Further individual controls include gender,
age, only child and family status (for details see Table B2 in the Appendix). * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p <
0.01
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In a supplementary analysis, we also test whether the well-being effects of parental unem-
ployment differ by the age and the gender of the child. In previous work, Haisken-DeNew
and Kind (2012) find that boys suffer significantly more from paternal unemployment than
girls. Bubonya, Cobb-Clark and Wooden (2017), reversely, find that the negative effect
seems greater for girls. Our results are provided in Tables B3 and B4 in the Appendix.
We find no significant differences in the effects of parental, respectively maternal and pater-
nal, unemployment for boys’ and girls’ well-being across countries. Regarding differences by
age, we find, similar to Powdthavee and Vernoit (2013), that older children are significantly
more affected by parental unemployment than younger children. We do, however, still find
a statistically significant negative effect also for younger children when controlling for family
wealth, but not when also considering the reported current income situation.
























































































































Note: The figure indicates the average difference in life satisfaction for children with at least
one parent looking for a job (including 95% confidence intervals) relative to children with
employed parents by country. The coefficient estimates are based on an OLS regression as in
column 2 of Table 2 that interacts parental unemployment with the country dummies.
In a further analysis, we study the well-being difference between children with employed and
children with unemployed parents by country. For this, the specification underlying the OLS
regression in column 2 of Table 2 is extended with interaction terms between the indicator
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for parental unemployment and the country dummies. Figure 2 presents the corresponding
results for the country-specific differences (including 95% confidence intervals). We observe
statistically significant differences in child well-being due to parental unemployment in al-
most every country. Moreover, there is substantial variation in the size of these differences.
Figure B1 in the Appendix presents additional descriptive evidence showing that also the sep-
arate differences for maternal and paternal unemployment vary strongly between countries.
In a next step, we investigate whether this variation is to some extent due to moderating
factors at the country level.
6 Child Well-Being and Unemployment Insurance
6.1 The moderating role of unemployment benefits
We analyze the potentially moderating effect of more or less generous unemployment benefits
in the extended estimation model 2. The focus is now on the interaction between parental
unemployment and the average replacement rate. This captures whether the negative corre-
lation between parental unemployment and child well-being is smaller in countries with more
generous benefits. The estimation results are presented in Table 3. We additionally depict
the marginal effects of parental, paternal and maternal unemployment as a function of the
average replacement rate in Figure 3.
Considering parental unemployment overall (columns 1 and 2, respectively panel 3a), we find
no statistically significant main effect and no moderating effect of more generous unemploy-
ment benefits on child well-being. Interestingly, once the perceived income situation is taken
into account, children’s subjective well-being seems positively correlated with the rate of
unemployment. Splitting the analysis for maternal and paternal unemployment yet reveals
that the insignificant interaction term in columns 1 and 2 might be driven by counteracting
moderation effects for paternal and maternal unemployment. Whereas the effect is not sta-
tistically significant at conventional levels, we find a negative interaction between maternal
unemployment and more generous unemployment benefits in column 3 (see also panel 3b).
In contrast, generous unemployment insurance seems to buffer the negative well-being effects
of father’s unemployment substantially. Panel 3c shows that in an environment with a com-
paratively low replacement rate for the unemployed (around 34 %), the life satisfaction of
children whose fathers are unemployed is, on average, 0.49 points lower on the 11-point scale
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than the life satisfaction of children who indicate their father as working. This difference
is significantly reduced to about 0.3 points at the average replacement rate of about 63 %
and diminishes further in environments with a comparatively high replacement rate (around
91 %).
Figure 3: Effect of parental unemployment on child well-being depending on the



































































Note: The figures show the marginal effects
of parental (panel 3a), maternal (panel 3b)
and paternal (panel 3c) unemployment on
child well-being at different levels of benefit
replacement rates based on OLS regressions
controlling for family wealth, with 90% con-
fidence intervals. Standard errors are two-
way clustered by country & wave. Specifi-
cation 2 in Table 3 shows the full regression
output.
When we additionally consider the proxy measure for the household’s current income in the
extended model, not surprisingly, the interaction terms get smaller. The coefficient for the
interaction between paternal unemployment and unemployment benefits is reduced by about
23 %. Yet, it remains positive and statistically significant. We thus find that the buffering
effect of more generous government transfers seems to not only reduce the pecuniary costs felt
by the children, but to some extent also the non-pecuniary costs of paternal unemployment.
Unemployed fathers might be less stressed with more generous benefits affecting children
over and above any changes in consumption. Alternatively, the finding might also hint at an
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underlying relationship between the generosity of unemployment benefits and social norms.17
We study this alternative mechanism in Section 6.3 by testing the robustness of our results
in a joint analysis taking social norms into account.
Table 3: Parental unemployment, unemployment benefits and child
well-being
Dependent variable: Life Satisfaction
(1) (2) (3) (4)
At least one parent unemployed -0.227*** -0.080***
(0.017) (0.016)
Mother unemployed -0.175*** -0.064***
(0.019) (0.018)
Father unemployed -0.307*** -0.108***
(0.025) (0.023)
Unempl. benefits -0.013 -0.001 -0.012 -0.001
(0.047) (0.056) (0.047) (0.056)
At least one parent unemployed × Unempl. benefits 0.016 0.015
(0.021) (0.018)
Mother unemployed × Unempl. benefits -0.029 -0.018
(0.019) (0.018)
Father unemployed × Unempl. benefits 0.084*** 0.064**
(0.032) (0.026)
Unempl. rate 0.014 0.065** 0.017 0.066***
(0.027) (0.025) (0.027) (0.025)
Individual controls X X X X
Proxies family wealth X X X X
Proxies for current income X X
Country FE X X X X
Year FE X X X X
Observations 440,567 440,567 440,567 440,567
R-squared 0.070 0.126 0.071 0.127
Note: The table shows the estimated effects of parental unemployment (columns 1-2), respectively ma-
ternal and paternal unemployment (columns 3-4) in interaction with average replacement rates on child
well-being using OLS. Standard errors are two-way clustered by country and survey year and displayed
in parentheses. * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01
17Such an alternative interpretation might also be applied to the finding for the interaction between
unemployment benefits and maternal unemployment. The finding that the differences are slightly larger in
countries with a higher average replacement rate (even though not statistically significantly) might be due
to weaker male bread-winning norms and hence stronger obligations for women to actively participate in the
labor market in these countries.
22
6.2 Robustness: Sensitivity to the sample composition
We identify the moderating effect of unemployment benefits based on within and between
country variation of the average replacement rate. We therefore test whether our main re-
sults for the buffering effect of unemployment benefits are driven by observations from a
single country. Figure 4 displays the coefficients for the interaction term between paternal
and maternal unemployment and the average replacement rate from separate estimations,
each time excluding observations from a different country. Detailed regression outputs can
be found in Table C1 in the Appendix.
Figure 4: Moderating role of unemployment benefits for parental unemployment:











































































































Note: The figure displays the coefficient (including 90 % confidence intervals) for the in-
teraction term between paternal (panel 4a), respectively maternal (panel 4b) unemploy-
ment and the average replacement rate based on the specification in column 3 of Table
3, excluding observations from one country at a time. Detailed regression outputs are
reported in Table C1 in the Appendix. AUT: Austria; BEL: Belgium; BGR: Bulgaria;
CAN: Canada; CRO: Croatia; CZE: Czech Republic; DNK: Denmark; EST: Estonia; FIN: Fin-
land; FRA: France; DEU: Germany; GRC: Greece; HUN: Hungary; ISL: Iceland; IRL: Ireland;
ISR: Israel; ITA: Italy; LVA: Latvia; LTU: Lithuania; LUX: Luxembourg; NLD: Netherlands;
NOR: Norway; POL: Poland; PRT: Portugal; ROU: Romania; SVK: Slovakia; SVN: Slove-
nia; ESP: Spain; SWE: Sweden; CHE: Switzerland; TUR: Turkey; GBR: Great Britain;
USA: United States of America.
In most estimations but two, the coefficient for the interaction with paternal unemployment
is rather stable. These two refer to samples excluding either Turkey or Great Britain. When
excluding Turkey, a smaller coefficient is estimated, though it remains positive, i.e., 0.047 in-
stead of 0.084, and statistically significant (p<0.1). Reversely, when excluding Great Britain
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from the sample, a larger coefficient for the interaction term is estimated, i.e., 0.099 (p<0.01)
instead of 0.084 (p<0.01). The changes reflect that the difference in life satisfaction between
children whose father is unemployed rather than employed differs between both countries
even though the average replacement rate is relatively low in both countries (xTUR = 36.5%
and xGBR = 45.5%, compared to the sample average of xAll = 64.1%). In Turkey, the raw
difference amounts to 1.29 points, the largest across the countries in our sample. In contrast,
in Great Britain, the difference is, on average, 0.38 and therewith falls below the sample
average difference of about 0.42.18 While we thus observe some sensitivity with regard to the
sample composition, the main finding of a buffering effect of benefits in the case of paternal
unemployment seems robust. For the interaction coefficient between maternal unemploy-
ment and unemployment benefits, we find no clear picture for a significant influence of one
country.
6.3 Robustness: The complementary influence of social work norms
We analyze whether social work norms affect the relationship between parental unemploy-
ment and child well-being and potentially explain part of the moderating relationship be-
tween parental unemployment and unemployment benefits, considering proxy measures for
descriptive norms as well as injunctive norms. Table 4 displays the results of the analysis,
where we add interaction terms with variables approximating social norms.
The specifications in columns 1 and 2 include the additional interaction terms between the
national unemployment rate and mother’s, respectively father’s, unemployment. With this
we test whether the effect of parental unemployment on child well-being is smaller in an en-
vironment in which more people are unemployed and parents, as well as children, suffer less
from social pressure. We do not find any systematic correlations for the interaction terms
between parental unemployment and the national unemployment rate. As before, we find a
statistically significant correlation between the unemployment rate and child well-being when
controlling for the household’s current income situation. The coefficient for the interaction
between paternal unemployment and the replacement rate remains sizeable and statistically
significant. This also holds when proxies for households’ current income are added.
18The comparatively small negative effect of parental unemployment on child-well being in Great Britain
seems though to be congruent with the results by Powdthavee and Vernoit (2013).
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As the pressure on unemployed fathers and mothers might differ depending on women’s in-
tegration on the labor market, we include the female-to-male labor force participation rate
as a gender-specific descriptive work norm in columns 3 and 4. We find that the negative
effect of paternal unemployment is smaller in countries with a higher female labor force par-
ticipation, suggesting less mental distress for unemployed fathers in environments in which
they are less exposed to a male bread-winning obligation. The positive correlation between
liberal descriptive gender norms and unemployment benefits is reflected in a smaller coeffi-
cient for the interaction term between paternal unemployment and unemployment benefits.
However, this latter coefficient remains positive and statistically significantly different from
0. Once we additionally consider how children perceive the current income situation of the
household, the descriptive gender norm does no longer add systematically to the prediction
of their well-being.
In columns 5 to 8, we analyze whether children are affected less by their parents’ lot, if
unemployed mothers and fathers experience less of a moral obligation to work due to weaker
injunctive norms. The results in columns 5 and 6 suggest that work norms, as measured in
the WVS, systematically moderate the effect of paternal unemployment on child well-being.
In countries with stricter norms, children suffer systematically more from paternal unem-
ployment (but not from maternal unemployment). For a one standard deviation increase in
this measure, the life satisfaction of a child is reduced by approximately 0.07 points more if
the father is unemployed. This is about a 20 % increase of the spillover effect of paternal
unemployment on child well-being. That mothers’ and fathers’ unemployment is moder-
ated differentially is congruent with the gender identity hypothesis and also with existing
evidence by Roex and Rözer (2018) who find a more pronounced effect of work norms for
unemployed men than for unemployed women. The generosity of unemployment benefits
remains an economically and statistically significant moderating variable for the effect of
paternal unemployment on child well-being. This indicates that the effect of unemployment
insurance as a formal institution goes beyond the expression of a norm. In columns 7 and 8,
we consider the alternative survey-based measure for gender-specific work norms referring to
the expressed priority that should be given to men on the labor market when jobs are scarce.
Similarly as for the tests which included the ratio of female-to-male labor force participa-
tion, we find that paternal unemployment seems to have slightly more severe and maternal




















































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































traditional male bread-winning norm, though the effect is not statistically significant at con-
ventional levels.
In a supplementary analysis, we test whether these results are sensitive to considering norms
from individuals under the age of 25, as opposed to the whole population. Figure A6 in the
Appendix depicts average values for these two groups. While general work norms seem to
differ only slightly across age groups, younger individuals in almost all countries exhibit sig-
nificantly lower traditional gender norms. The results for the interactions between parental
unemployment and injunctive norms of individuals under the age of 25 are overall very similar
to the ones using norms across all age groups (see Table C2 in the Appendix). The nega-
tive interaction between general work norms and father’s unemployment is slightly stronger
(though the difference in coefficients is not statistically significantly). Furthermore, we ob-
serve that the coefficient for the interaction term between maternal unemployment and the
gender work norm is weaker when we consider the norm expressed by younger generations.
This might indicate that the moderating effect of gender-specific work norms is rather driven
by indirect spillover effects of parental well-being rather than direct effects on the well-being
of children with unemployed parents.
7 Conclusions
Based on a unique repeated cross-sectional data set of school-aged children in Europe, the
Middle East and North America, we study how parental unemployment affects the life satis-
faction of their offspring. Our analysis offers a novel comparative view on inter-generational
effects of unemployment. Specifically, it relates the negative consequences on children’s well-
being to formal and informal institutions. In line with existing evidence, we find that the
experience of parental unemployment, irrespective of the parents’ gender, has strong adverse
effects on children’s subjective well-being. Thereby, the spillover effects of paternal unem-
ployment are significantly worse than the one’s of maternal unemployment in the majority
of countries in our study.
We argue that a better understanding of the origins of such differences can help in design-
ing effective policy responses, not only to reduce the costs of unemployment for the people
personally affected, but also potential externalities for relatives. In our study, we emphasize
the generosity of unemployment benefits as such a potential moderating factor. Our results
indicate that generous insurance against the financial consequences of unemployment can
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not only mitigate the negative effects for the unemployed individuals (for a review, see e.g.,
O’Campo et al., 2015), but also reduce the negative spillover effects of paternal unemploy-
ment on their children’s well-being.
Prior research on personal unemployment has shown that this status relates to less severe
well-being consequences in environments with weaker social work norms. We therefore test
the robustness of our results considering general and gender-specific measures for descriptive
and injunctive work norms. While unemployment benefits and social norms have seldom
been statistically studied together, we argue that the joint analysis of these two factors is
crucial, as both theoretical (e.g., Lindbeck, 1995; Bisin and Verdier, 2005) as well as empirical
studies (e.g., Ljunge, 2012) suggest an endogeneity of work norms and the generosity of the
unemployment insurance systems, which could potentially bias the result of either separate
analysis. Our results show that parental unemployment is a larger burden for children’s
well-being in environments with a stronger injunctive work norm and that the differences
in the spillover effects of maternal and paternal unemployment are partly explained by the
relative strength of the traditional male bread-winning norm. The moderating effect of more
generous unemployment benefits for paternal unemployment is, however, robust against the
inclusion of all norm proxies. Our findings suggest that programs targeting unemployed in-
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Figure A1: Coding scheme of family status and parental employment status
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Note: The flowchart depicts the derivation of the employment status variable for mothers
and fathers. The areas shaded in gray denote questions from the HBSC questionnaire. In
a first step, we determine the child’s family status (FS), where children can live either with
both parents (FS1); with the mother and be in contact with the father (FS2) or not (FS3); or
live with the father and be in contact with the mother (FS4) or not (FS5). We base this on
information from the questions “All families are different (for example, not everyone lives with
both their parents, sometimes people live with just one parent, or they have two homes or live
with two families) and we would like to know about yours. Please answer this first question
for the home where you live all or most of the time and tick the people who live there.” and
“How easy is it for you to talk to the following persons about things that really bother you”
where one possible answer is “Don’t have or see this person”. Children who do not live with
either parent are excluded from the analysis. In a second step, we generate a variable for the
parents’ employment status, based on the variables occupsesfa/occupsesmo from the HBSC
data. For this, we only consider parents that the child is in contact with, hence for FS1, FS2
and FS4, we consider both parents, whereas we automatically code the parent that the child is
not in contact with in FS3 and FS5 as “no contact with” in order to not lose observations from
children who are only raised by one parent. All children whose parents (they are in contact
with) cannot be classified as either working, home working or unemployed, are also excluded
from the analysis.
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Official UR (OECD)
Note: The graph depicts the relationship between yearly country level unemployment rates
based on the information of the parents’ employment statuses in the HBSC data and the official
unemployment rates in the respective countries published by the OECD. The correlation is
r=0.82 (p<0.01).
A.1.2 Measures of family wealth and income situation
We approximate the wealth and income situation of the family based on two different mea-
sures that were developed specifically for the HBSC survey in order to collect information
on the socio-economic background of children.
Family Affluence Scale — The Family Affluence Scale (FAS) includes a set of items that
are simple to answer for children, non-intrusive and non-sensitive, and supposed to reflect
assets and consumption patterns which are relevant to family circumstances. The scale was
validated, both concerning its external criterion validity on the national (Boyce et al., 2006)
and regional level (Hobza et al., 2017), and indicates high concurrent validity in terms of
relationships with cohesive outcomes (Currie et al., 2008) and also moderate internal validity
(e.g., Torsheim et al., 2016).
Children are required to report on family ownership of goods and access to services, using
the following questions1 (Currie et al., 1997):
1These questions are valid since the third wave in 2001/2 and thus the first wave of data that is used
here. The scale has been adjusted in order to reflect changing societal patterns of consumption and lifestyle
patterns. The computer item, for example, was only added in the 2001/2 wave and replaced the item of
whether the family has a phone in their house (Currie et al., 2010).
2
• “Does your family own a car, van or truck?”
[No; Yes, one; Yes, two or more]
• “Do you have your own bedroom for yourself?”
[No; Yes]
• “During the past 12 months, how many times did you travel away on holiday (vacation)
with your family?”
[Not at all; Once; Twice; More than twice]
• “How many computers does your family own?”
[None; One; Two; More than two]
Perceived socio-economic situation — In addition to the FAS, children in the HBSC
are further asked about their perception of their own family’s socio-economic circumstances,
respectively perceived social status, using the following question:
• “How well off do you think your family is?”
[Very well off; Quite well off; Average; Not so well off; Not at all well off]
We consider the number of family cars, the number of computers and the availability of an
own bedroom as measures of family wealth, and the number of holidays and the statement
about being more or less well off as measures of the current income situation. The correlation
between the five measures and parental unemployment are presented in Table A1.
Table A1: Parental unemployment and family affluence
Dependent variable: Family Cars Computers Own Bedroom Holidays Welloff
Parental Unemployment -0.244*** -0.225*** -0.072*** -0.247*** -0.265***
(0.006) (0.010) (0.005) (0.009) (0.010)
Country-Year FE X X X X X
Observations 482,561 482,467 481,539 481,829 484,677
R-squared 0.157 0.344 0.087 0.087 0.141
Note: The table displays correlation coefficients between parental unemployment and the three measures of family
wealth (number of family cars - column 1; number of computers - column 2; own bedroom - column 3) and the
two measures of current income proxies (number of holidays last year - column 4; welloff - column 5) using OLS
estimations. Standard errors are two-way clustered by country and survey year and displayed in parentheses. *
p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01
3















































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Note: The figure shows the average unemployment replacement rate by survey year and
country. The value represents the mean of six different replacement rates, i.e., for two different
unemployment durations (six and twelve months) and three family types (couple with two
children and average earnings of the partner, couple with two children and partner out of
work, and single parent with two dependent children.
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Note: The figure shows the official unemployment rate by survey year and country.
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Note: The figure shows the ratio of the female-to-male labor force participation rate by survey
year and country. At a ratio of 100, equally many women participate in the labor market as
men.
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Country average <25 Years old
(b) Gender-specific norm
Note: Panel A6a shows the general injunctive work norm by country. This measure is derived
by combining and averaging over the five following statements from the World Value Survey:
(1) “To fully develop your talents, you need to have a job.”, (2) “It is humiliating to receive
money without working for it.”, (3) “People who don’t work become lazy.”, (4) “Work is a duty
towards society.” and (5) “Work should always come first, even if it means less free time.”.
The blue bars represent the country average over all age groups, the red bar represent country
averages of individuals under the age of 25. Panel A6b shows the gender-specific work norm
by country. It captures the fraction of the population agreeing with the statement “When
jobs are scarce, men should have more right to work than women.” The blue bars represent
the country average over all age groups, the red bar represent country averages of individuals




Table B1: Summary statistics
All Employed parents Unemployed parentsa
Mean Std. dev Mean Std. dev Mean Std. dev Diff P-Value
Life satisfaction 7.65 1.85 7.67 1.84 7.38 2.04 -0.30 0.000
Female 0.52 0.50 0.51 0.50 0.54 0.50 0.02 0.000
Age 13.65 1.68 13.66 1.68 13.64 1.68 -0.01 0.181
Living with siblings 0.73 0.45 0.73 0.44 0.70 0.46 -0.03 0.000
Only Child 0.13 0.33 0.12 0.33 0.15 0.35 0.02 0.003
Living with both parents 0.81 0.40 0.81 0.39 0.77 0.42 -0.03 0.000
Living with mother 0.17 0.38 0.17 0.38 0.20 0.40 0.03 0.000
Living with father 0.02 0.15 0.02 0.15 0.03 0.16 0.01 0.000
Parental employment status
Mother employed 0.82 0.39 0.86 0.35 0.25 0.44 -0.60 0.000
Mother homeworking 0.13 0.34 0.13 0.34 0.08 0.27 -0.06 0.000
Mother unemployed 0.04 0.20 - - 0.66 0.47 0.66 0.000
No contact with mother 0.01 0.08 0.01 0.08 0.01 0.07 0.00 0.004
Father employed 0.91 0.28 0.94 0.23 0.52 0.50 -0.42 0.000
Father homeworking 0.01 0.09 0.01 0.09 0.00 0.07 0.00 0.000
Father unemployed 0.03 0.16 - - 0.42 0.49 0.42 0.000
No contact with father 0.05 0.22 0.05 0.22 0.05 0.23 0.00 0.000
Proxies family wealth
No car 0.08 0.27 0.07 0.26 0.20 0.40 0.13 0.000
One car 0.39 0.49 0.39 0.49 0.47 0.50 0.08 0.000
Two or more cars 0.51 0.50 0.52 0.50 0.31 0.46 -0.21 0.000
No Own bedroom 0.21 0.40 0.20 0.40 0.31 0.46 0.12 0.000
Own bedroom 0.77 0.42 0.78 0.41 0.66 0.47 -0.12 0.000
Proxies for current income
Not at all well off 0.01 0.10 0.01 0.09 0.03 0.16 0.02 0.000
Not very well off 0.05 0.22 0.05 0.21 0.12 0.33 0.08 0.000
Average 0.39 0.49 0.38 0.49 0.44 0.50 0.06 0.000
Quite well off 0.35 0.48 0.36 0.48 0.27 0.44 -0.09 0.000
Very well off 0.18 0.39 0.19 0.39 0.13 0.33 -0.06 0.000
No holiday/year 0.18 0.39 0.17 0.38 0.29 0.45 0.12 0.000
One holiday/year 0.29 0.45 0.29 0.45 0.29 0.45 0.00 0.913
Two holidays/year 0.23 0.42 0.23 0.42 0.18 0.38 -0.05 0.000
More than two holidays/year 0.28 0.45 0.29 0.45 0.22 0.41 -0.07 0.000
N 492,290 459,554 (93.35%) 32,736 (6.65%)
Note: a: At least one parent unemployed
12
B.2 Individual-level covariates
Table B2: Parental unemployment and child well-being - further co-
variates
Dependent variable: Life Satisfaction
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Girl 0.050** 0.058*** 0.065*** 0.051** 0.058*** 0.065***
(0.020) (0.020) (0.020) (0.020) (0.020) (0.021)
Reference category: Age 11 and younger
12 -0.037* -0.039** -0.027 -0.037* -0.039** -0.027
(0.019) (0.018) (0.018) (0.019) (0.018) (0.018)
13 -0.326*** -0.338*** -0.267*** -0.325*** -0.337*** -0.267***
(0.021) (0.021) (0.021) (0.021) (0.021) (0.021)
14 -0.383*** -0.400*** -0.311*** -0.382*** -0.399*** -0.310***
(0.025) (0.025) (0.025) (0.025) (0.025) (0.025)
15 -0.611*** -0.631*** -0.470*** -0.609*** -0.629*** -0.470***
(0.028) (0.028) (0.030) (0.028) (0.028) (0.030)
16 or older -0.633*** -0.657*** -0.479*** -0.631*** -0.655*** -0.479***
(0.030) (0.030) (0.030) (0.030) (0.030) (0.031)
Reference category: Girl x 11
Girl × 12 -0.040* -0.038* -0.036 -0.039* -0.037 -0.035
(0.022) (0.022) (0.022) (0.022) (0.022) (0.022)
Girl × 13 -0.249*** -0.247*** -0.212*** -0.248*** -0.247*** -0.212***
(0.026) (0.026) (0.027) (0.026) (0.026) (0.027)
Girl × 14 -0.309*** -0.304*** -0.267*** -0.307*** -0.303*** -0.267***
(0.026) (0.026) (0.026) (0.026) (0.026) (0.026)
Girl × 15 -0.426*** -0.423*** -0.369*** -0.423*** -0.421*** -0.368***
(0.028) (0.028) (0.028) (0.028) (0.028) (0.028)
Girl × 16 or older -0.405*** -0.401*** -0.361*** -0.403*** -0.400*** -0.360***
(0.025) (0.026) (0.026) (0.026) (0.026) (0.026)
Reference Category: Living with siblings
Only Child 0.092*** 0.063*** 0.047*** 0.096*** 0.067*** 0.051***
(0.012) (0.011) (0.011) (0.012) (0.011) (0.011)
Reference category: Living with both parents
Living with mother only -0.458*** -0.416*** -0.296*** -0.402*** -0.377*** -0.269***
(0.013) (0.013) (0.013) (0.013) (0.013) (0.012)
Living with father only -0.624*** -0.601*** -0.517*** -0.551*** -0.537*** -0.461***
(0.025) (0.025) (0.023) (0.028) (0.028) (0.025)
Further parental working statuses
Reference category: Working
Mother homeworking 0.008 0.043*** 0.051***
(0.011) (0.010) (0.010)
Mother unemployed -0.219*** -0.166*** -0.054***
(0.018) (0.018) (0.016)
No contact with mother -0.248*** -0.215*** -0.188***
(0.051) (0.050) (0.052)
Father homeworking -0.248*** -0.176*** -0.074**
(0.037) (0.036) (0.036)
Father unemployed -0.384*** -0.307*** -0.104***
(0.028) (0.024) (0.022)
No contact with father -0.201*** -0.140*** -0.091***
(0.019) (0.019) (0.018)
Both parents unemployed 0.157*** 0.163*** 0.086*
(0.058) (0.058) (0.051)
Parental unemployment X X X
Paternal unemployment X X X
Maternal unemployment X X X
Country-Year FE X X X X X X
Observations 492,290 492,290 492,290 492,290 492,290 492,290
R-squared 0.071 0.076 0.134 0.072 0.077 0.134
Note: The table displays the OLS-coefficients of the individual level covariates from Table 2. Standard errors
are two-way clustered by country and survey year and displayed in parentheses. * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, ***
p < 0.01
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B.3 Differential effects of paternal and maternal unemployment on
child well-being
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(ah) US
Note: The figures indicates the average difference in life satisfaction between children with
working parents and children with either mother or father unemployed, including 95% con-
fidence intervals, by country. The coefficient estimates are based on from OLS regression as




Table B3: Parental unemployment and child well-being by gender
Dependent variable: Life Satisfaction
(1) (2) (3) (4)
At least one parent unemployed -0.211*** -0.065***
(0.019) (0.017)
Mother unemployed -0.160*** -0.051**
(0.022) (0.021)
Father unemployed -0.297*** -0.100***
(0.032) (0.030)
At least one parent unemployed × Girl -0.021 -0.014
(0.022) (0.022)
Mother unemployed × Girl -0.008 -0.002
(0.027) (0.027)
Father unemployed × Girl -0.018 -0.008
(0.040) (0.039)
Individual Controls X X X X
Country-Year FE X X X X
Observations 492290 492290 492290 492290
R-squared 0.074 0.132 0.075 0.133
Note: The table shows heterogeneity in the relationship between parental unemployment (columns 1 & 2),
respectively maternal and paternal unemployment (columns 3 & 4), and child life satisfaction by gender
using OLS. Standard errors are two-way clustered by country and survey year and displayed in parenthe-
ses. Further individual controls include age, only child and family status. * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, ***
p < 0.01
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Table B4: Parental unemployment and child well-being by
age
Dependent variable: Life Satisfaction
(1) (2) (3) (4)
At least one parent unemployed -0.136*** -0.045
(0.037) (0.036)
Mother unemployed -0.099** -0.023
(0.044) (0.043)
Father unemployed -0.215*** -0.092
(0.062) (0.055)
12 -0.063*** -0.051*** -0.063*** -0.053***
(0.016) (0.016) (0.017) (0.016)
13 -0.464*** -0.378*** -0.462*** -0.376***
(0.021) (0.022) (0.022) (0.022)
14 -0.554*** -0.449*** -0.545*** -0.443***
(0.023) (0.024) (0.023) (0.024)
15 -0.842*** -0.659*** -0.826*** -0.648***
(0.028) (0.030) (0.028) (0.030)
16 or older -0.851*** -0.659*** -0.829*** -0.642***
(0.030) (0.032) (0.030) (0.031)
At least one parent unemployed × 12 0.017 0.045
(0.046) (0.042)
At least one parent unemployed × 13 -0.055 -0.004
(0.048) (0.048)
At least one parent unemployed × 14 -0.081* -0.015
(0.044) (0.043)
At least one parent unemployed × 15 -0.161*** -0.075
(0.052) (0.053)
At least one parent unemployed × 16 or older -0.221*** -0.113**
(0.048) (0.048)
Mother unemployed × 12 0.045 0.050
(0.057) (0.052)
Mother unemployed × 13 -0.061 -0.026
(0.057) (0.056)
Mother unemployed × 14 -0.066 -0.024
(0.056) (0.054)
Mother unemployed × 15 -0.148** -0.086
(0.058) (0.057)
Mother unemployed × 16 or older -0.177*** -0.107*
(0.059) (0.059)
Father unemployed × 12 -0.023 0.032
(0.075) (0.067)
Father unemployed × 13 0.035 0.088
(0.080) (0.075)
Father unemployed × 14 -0.080 -0.000
(0.068) (0.065)
Father unemployed × 15 -0.145 -0.041
(0.089) (0.087)
Father unemployed × 16 or older -0.250*** -0.109
(0.078) (0.072)
Individual Controls X X X X
Country-Year FE X X X X
Observations 492290 492290 492290 492290
R-squared 0.075 0.133 0.075 0.133
Note: The table shows heterogeneity in the relationship between parental unemployment
(columns 1 & 2), respectively maternal and paternal unemployment (columns 3 & 4), and
child life satisfaction by age using OLS. Standard errors are two-way clustered by country
and survey year and displayed in parentheses. Further individual controls include age, only
child and family status. * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01
17

























































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Table C2: Parental unemployment, injunctive work norms of the
younger generation and child well-being
Dependent Variable: Life Satisfaction
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Mother unemployed -0.182*** -0.065*** -0.181*** -0.065***
(0.019) (0.018) (0.019) (0.019)
Father unemployed -0.309*** -0.110*** -0.307*** -0.110***
(0.024) (0.023) (0.024) (0.023)
Unempl. benefits -0.012 -0.002 -0.013 -0.003
(0.047) (0.056) (0.047) (0.056)
Mother unemployed × Unempl. benefits -0.026 -0.018 -0.024 -0.017
(0.019) (0.018) (0.020) (0.019)
Father unemployed × Unempl. benefits 0.070*** 0.053** 0.074** 0.061**
(0.026) (0.024) (0.029) (0.025)
Unempl. rate 0.017 0.066*** 0.018 0.066***
(0.027) (0.025) (0.027) (0.025)
Mother unemployed × Work norm (<25) -0.014 -0.012
(0.026) (0.024)
Father unemployed × Work norm (<25) -0.084*** -0.060***
(0.031) (0.022)
Mother unemployed × Gender work norm (<25) 0.010 0.006
(0.018) (0.017)
Father unemployed × Gender work norm (<25) -0.035 -0.011
(0.037) (0.028)
Individual controls X X X X
Proxies family wealth X X X X
Proxies for current income X X
Country FE X X X X
Year FE X X X X
Observations 436,804 436,804 436,804 436,804
R-squared 0.071 0.126 0.071 0.126
Note: The table shows the estimated effects of maternal, respectively paternal, unemployment and
their interaction with the general work norm of individuals younger than 25 years old (columns 1-2)
and the gender-specific work norm of individuals younger than 25 years old (columns 3-4) on child
well-being using OLS, meanwhile controlling for the interaction between maternal/paternal unem-
ployment and the average replacement rate. Standard errors are two-way clustered by country and
survey year and displayed in parentheses. * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01
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